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Browne: Private Mortgage Insurance

THE PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE INDUSTRY,
THE THRIFT INDUSTRY
AND THE SECONDARY MORTGAGE MARKET:
THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIPS
DIANA

I.

T

HE CONCEPT

G.

BROWNE*

INTRODUCTION

of private mortgage insurance is a simple one. At the time

a mortgage loan is made, the lender requires, as a condition to making
a loan with a high loan to value ratio, that the borrower purchase private
mortgage insurance on a portion of the loan, generally the top 20 to 25%.
While the premiums are paid by the borrower, either at the time the loan
is made or over the early life of the loan, the insured is not the borrower
but the lender which, under the terms of the insurance contract, will be
indemnified for losses incurred by virtue of the borrower's default.
Thus, the private mortgage insurance contract is similar to a suretyship agreement: if the party who is primarily responsible for the performance of an obligation (the borrower) fails to perform that obligation (to
repay the mortgage loan) the party who has become secondarily liable
for performance (the mortgage insurer) will perform the obligation. However, mortgage insurance differs from the standard suretyship agreement
in one important respect. The insurer is not subrogated to the rights of
the lender. Under the standard mortgage insurance master policy, a mortgage insurer generally has the option in the event of default and foreclosure either to pay the lender the contractually agreed upon 20 to 25%
and permit the lender to retain the property, or to pay the lender the entire
mortgage amount and to take title to the property. Whichever option is
exercised by the insurer, the insurer's rights are limited to rights against
the property and the borrower has no futher liability.
While the direct beneficiary of mortgage insurance is the lender,
there are indirect but substantial benefits to the borrower. The availability
of insurance coverage to insure payment on the top portion of high ratio
loans has made lenders more willing to make such high ratio loans. As
*Assistant General Counsel, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.; B.A., Wellesley College;

J.D., George Washington University. The views expressed in this article are those of the
author, and do not necessarily represent the views of any organization with which she is
affiliated.
The author gratefully acknowledges the editorial assistance of Henry L. Judy (General
Counsel, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp.), Robert T. Lasky (Pennsylvania and
District of Columbia Bars) and Mark C. Ellenberg (District of Columbia Bar).
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a result, borrowers are able to obtain conventional mortgage loans for up
to 95% of the appraised value of the homes, which in turn enables those
borrowers to purchase better homes (or at least larger or more expensive
homes) in return for smaller initial investments.
The concept of private mortgage insurance is not new, although the
modern era in the industry did not begin until 1957. Insurance companies,
most of which were chartered and operated under the laws of New York,
began guaranteeing repayment of mortgage loans in the late nineteenth
century. That industry continued to expand until it collapsed in the early
1930s as a result of the combined forces of the Depression and questionable practices in the industry itself. For the next twenty-five years mortgage
insurance was provided by the government, primarily by the Federal
Housing Administration (FHA) beginning in 1934. In addition, loans
were guaranteed by the Veterans Administration (VA) beginning in
1944. The era of private mortgage insurance as it exists today began in
1.957 when Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (MGIC) was
chartered under the laws of Wisconsin.
The private mortgage insurance industry has experienced tremendous
growth since 1957 in terms of the number of companies doing business
as well as the volume of business handled, both absolutely and in relation
to government insurance programs. This absolute and proportional growth
is primarily attributable to three factors: the inherent advantages of private
mortgage insurance over government mortgage insurance; federal regulations permitting lenders to make higher ratio loans if such loans are
covered by private mortgage insurance; and the expansion of the secondary
market in conventional mortgages, particularly the federal public secondary
market in which coverage by private mortgage insurance is a prerequisite
to the purchase of high ratio loans.1
On the other hand, the existence of the private mortgage insurance
industry has facilitated the expansion of the thrift industry and of the
secondary mortgage market. Twenty-two years after the formation of the
first modern private mortgage insurance company and nine years after
the creation of the federally sponsored market in conventional mortgage
loans, the growth and success of the three industries can be seen as significantly interrelated.

I Pursuant

to statute, coverage by private mortgage insurance is only one of three alternative prerequisites to the purchase of high ratio loans. However, as a policy matter, private
mortgage insurance is required on such loans as a prerequisite to purchase. See discussion
in Section m C, infra.
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INSURANCE

INDUSTRY

A. Pre-Depression
The first era in the private mortgage insurance industry began in the
late nineteenth century as an outgrowth of the title insurance industry and
reached its height in the early 1930s, immediately before it collapsed
entirely. The mortgage guaranty industry was concentrated almost entirely
in New York and was regulated, to the extent that it was regulated at
all, under the laws of New York. In order to understand today's concerns
with regard to the structure and practices of the private mortgage insurance
industry, it is necessary to study the evolution of the early private mortgage
guaranty industry, its structure and practices. A 1974 article dealing with
regulation of private mortgage insurance states that "the operations during
that [pre-depression] era led to the historical image of an industry filled
with financial malpractice, chicanery, manipulation of the small investor,
and disaster in a largely unregulated environment."2 After the collapse
of the mortgage guaranty industry, New York Governor Herbert H. Lehman
ordered an investigation both of the State Insurance Department's activities with regard to the title insurance and mortgage guaranty companies,
and of the companies themselves. The Governor also requested recommendations for legislation which would provide adequate supervision of
the industry by the State Insurance Department. This investigation resulted
in an exhaustive report on the growth of the mortgage guaranty industry,
the practices of the industry and the problems caused by those practices.
The report ended with a series of recommendations for the prevention
of the recurrence of similar problems.3 This report, commonly known as
the Alger Report, has been characterized as the "cornerstone of all regulation" of the mortgage insurance industry.'
The mortgage insurance industry in New York grew out of an 1885
statute authorizing title insurance. This statute was broadly interpreted by
title insurance companies to permit guarantee not only of title but of
payment by the mortgagor as well. This interpretation was adopted by
the New York legislature in 1904 through an amendment to the Insurance
Law which permitted title companies to guarantee payment of bonds and
mortgages against loss incurred by reason of defective title or other incumbrances. Companies were required to maintain a guaranty fund equal
2Johnson and Flanigan, Regulation of Private Mortgage Insurance, C.P.C.U.

Annals 92
(June 1974).
s Report to His Excellency Herbert H. Lehman, Governor of the State of New York, by
George W. Alger, Moreland Comm'r (October 5, 1934).
4 Graaskamnp, Development and Structure of Mortgage Loan Guaranty Insurance in the
United States, J. of Risk and Ins. 48 (March 1967).
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to two-thirds of their original capital stock. There was no limit on outstanding guarantees in relationship to capital, but if the guaranty fund
was impaired, the company could write no more insurance until it became "unimpaired." Companies were permitted to invest the guaranty fund
in mortgages.

In 1911, the Insurance Law was amended to permit the companies
to invest in, purchase and sell bonds and mortgages which were lawful
investments for insurance companies, with guarantee of payment or guarantee of title alone. This authority was expanded in 1913 to permit the
guarantee of individual or partnership notes which were secured by mortgages or deed of trust upon real property, provided that such instruments
were on real property worth 50% more than the amount loaned thereon.
The protective features of the legislation adopted in 1904 with regard
to the guaranty fund were weakened in 1929 as the law then no longer
required that a separate guaranty fund be maintained. Instead, the requirement was only that two-thirds of the company's paid-in capital be invested
in "minimum capital investments," defined as federal, state, city or county
obligations, or bonds and mortgages. The company merely had to hold
these investments among their assets; they were not required to be segregated.
In short, each amendment to the State Insurance Law increased the
authority of the title insurance and mortgage guaranty companies, and
each attempt to limit those companies' powers was defeated in the legislature. This progressive liberalization of the Insurance Law has been attributed
to control by the industry,5 which control was partially a result of public
confidence in the companies. The companies' officers and directors were
well respected in their communities, and real estate was perceived as a
sound investment. This latter assumption had been existent for many
years: in an economy where real estate prices had continued to rise and
foreclosed property could be sold at a profit, the companies had been able
to operate for many years without a loss. There was little oversight of
the mortgage guaranty companies' operations. The review that did exist
was performed by the State Insurance Department which had limited
jurisdiction and was not staffed adequately to successfully carry out even
its assigned functions.
Although their business involved guaranteeing the payment of mortgage
loans, the mortgage guaranty companies of the early twentieth century
"One can reasonably deduce that the evolution of legislation granting authority for mortgage guarantee activity was controlled largely by the companies involved in the business."
Johnson and Flanigan, supra note 2 at 93.
5
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functioned substantially differently from the present mortgage insurance
industry. Today's mortgage insurance companies issue insurance commitments to protect the lender against loss resulting from nonpayment by
the borrower. In return for providing this protection, the insurer receives
premiums paid by the borrower. The insurer never owns the mortgage or
any interest in the mortgage. If the lender sells the mortgage in whole or
in part to any investor, the mortgage insurance remains in force to protect
the investor as well. However, the sale of the mortgage is essentially irrelevant to the insurer: the insurer does not participate in the sale and its
interests are not affected thereby. In contrast, the old mortgage guaranty
companies purchased mortgages from originators. The companies then
sold the mortgages to investors, either as individual mortgages or as certificates representing an interest of a particular dollar amount in a pool
of mortgages, with a guarantee of principal and interest payment. The
guarantee was given subsequent to the origination of the loan, and obtaining
the guarantee was not a condition to the loan's being made. The borrower
did not pay a premium. Instead, the mortgage guaranty companies made
their profits from the sale of the mortgages themselves and from the
guarantee fees paid by the investor. This operation is more closely analogous
to today's secondary mortgage market than to today's private mortgage insurance industry.
The Alger Report also dealt in detail with the structure of the mortgage guaranty companies and the problems created thereby. Many problems
were created by the use of holding companies, particularly the affiliations
between mortgage guaranty companies and banks. Common ownership
of stock, ownership of each other's stock, common officers and directors,
joint mortgage committees and joint appraisal departments were widespread
practices. When banks and mortgage guaranty companies were thus affiliated, problems existed whether the mortgage guaranty company was the
subsidiary or the parent. When the bank was the parent, the investing
public was given the impression (often with the aid of deceptive advertising) that the guarantee on the certificates sold by the mortgage guaranty
company constituted a guarantee by the bank. When the bank was the
subsidiary, it was often forced into unsound banking practices for the
benefit of the mortgage guaranty company. Subsidiary banks were frequently pressured into making questionable loans so that the mortgage
guaranty company could then sell the loans. The mortgage guaranty companies had no fear of loss in these transactions; even if they had to pay
off on their guarantee, the foreclosed properties could generally be sold
at a profit. Further, the parent mortgage guaranty companies could require
their subsidiary banks to deposit funds in a manner which would benefit
the parent company. The Alger Report cited an example in which a
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mortgage guaranty company required its subsidiary bank to deposit its
funds in a large bank in order to induce the large bank to make a loan
to another subsidiary of the mortgage guaranty company.
The problems of deception and self-dealing through subsidiaries were
not limited to cases in which the affiliates were banking institutions. In
the nonbanking context, a major problem was the use of subsidiaries to
hold title to foreclosed property. This foreclosed real estate owned by the
subsidiary would appear on the mortgage guaranty company's balance
sheet as "stocks owned" in the amount of the foreclosed mortgage plus
interest, foreclosure costs and expenses. Thus a false impression of the mortgage guaranty company's financial strength was given. In addition, these
subsidiaries were used as a mechanism whereby new mortgages on the
property could be originated and sold to investors. The subsidiary became
the mortgagor on the property, and the parent mortgage guaranty became
the mortgagee. The mortgage guaranty company then guaranteed and sold
the mortgage. The investing public had no means of knowing that the
original mortgage had been foreclosed or that the mortgagor whose obligation the mortgage guaranty company was guaranteeing was in fact that
company's subsidiary. Because the State Insurance Department had no
jurisdiction to investigate the subsidiaries of mortgage guaranty companies,
the questionable practices carried out through the subsidiaries were hidden
from public view.
The selling of foreclosed mortgages was also facilitated by the typical
payment provisions in the mortgage certificates. Under the terms of the
certificate, the mortgage guaranty company made interest payments to
the investor throughout the life of the mortgage loan, but was not required
to make principal payments until eighteen months after the loan was due.
Most certificates gave the mortgage guaranty company the further right
to substitute mortgages in the portfolio which backed the certificates. Thus,
sound mortgages which could be sold individually to sophisticated investors
were removed from the portfolio and replaced with mortgages already
in default. When real estate values began to fall in 1931, the eighteen
month clause was frequently invoked. However, the mortgage guaranty
companies continued to advertise mortgages and mortgage certificates as
sound investments and sold them until the Bank Holiday on March 4, 1933.
Between the Bank Holiday and August 3, 1933, nearly all of the
mortgage guaranty companies were taken over by the state. When the
state took over forty-seven companies (fifty had existed at the height of
the industry in 1931) it was discovered that in the aggregate they had
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss4/2
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$184,000,000 in capital and surplus to secure $1,700,000,000 in mortgage
and real estate securities."
The Alger Report contained a number of recommendations for legislation to prevent a recurrence of the disaster that had befallen the mortgage
guaranty industry. These recommendations included: annual examinations
by the government, supervision of appraisal, limitations on the guarantee
amount with regard to a particular mortgage vis-a-vis the appraised value
of the property, limitations on the total guarantees a company had outstanding in relation to the company's capital and surplus, limitations on
ownership of other companies by mortgage guaranty companies and ownership of mortgage guaranty companies by other entities, and penal provisions in the conflict of interest area. However, rather than adopting these
recommendations, the New York State legislature outlawed mortgage
guaranty insurance entirely in 1938. Because most of the mortgage
guaranty business had been concentrated in New York, the industry nearly
ceased to exist
B.

Government Insurance
The involvement of the federal government in the mortgage insurance
area began when Congress enacted the National Housing Act of 1934,
authorizing the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) to insure home
mortgage insurance loans.8 The FHA program9 has been described as the
first attempt to apply insurance principles to mortgage insurance, and the
creation of the FHA as the factor that eventually made possible the reconsideration of private mortgage insurance in 1957.10
Nevertheless, there were a number of problems with FHA insurance
which prevented its total acceptance by lending institutions, particularly
savings and loan lenders. Certain FHA practices were regarded by lenders
as substantial federal government interference with their lending practices.
Among the practices regarded by the lenders as most objectionable were the
settings of detailed standards to which FHA approved mortgages were
required to adhere and the performance by FHA of appraisal and underwriting functions for individual loans prior to insuring them which resulted
in substantial delays in making loans. The savings and loan industry was
6Graaskamp, supra note 4 at 50.
7
8

Johnson and Flanigan, supra note 2 at 95.
12 U.S.C. § 1709 (1964).

9A more limited government mortgage guaranty program was enacted as part of the
Servicemen's Readjustment Act, ch. 268, 58 Stat. 291 (1944), as amended 38 U.S.C. §
1810 (1964), whereby the Veterans Administration was authorized to guarantee loans made
to veterans.
10 Graaskamp, supra note 4 at 52-53.
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also uncomfortable with the hidden charges of the points system which
had resulted from the below market interest ceilings on FHA loans. Finally,
FHA insurance was expensive to the borrower: the insurance premium
was not only high (one-half of one percent) but was also required to be
paid throughout the life of the loan. 1
An attempt was made by the savings and loan industry to create a
government insurance program which would avoid the problems it perceived
to exist with FHA. In 1958, the United States League of Savings Associations secured the introduction of legislation, for inclusion in the Housing
Act of 1958, which would have created a subsidiary of the Federal Home
Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) to provide home mortgage insurance. Unlike
FHA insurance, the proposed FHLBB subsidiary would have insured only
the top 20% of each loan, and only for the first ten years; it would have
relied upon the appraisal and underwriting performed by the lender subject
to spotchecks by the insurer; and there would have been no interest
ceilings. However, banking interests secured amendments which would
have incorporated into the legislation a number of the features of FHA
insurance which the savings and loan industry found objectionable. The
savings and loan industry therefore disclaimed the bill, and it was subsequently defeated.'
The Modern Era of Private Mortgage Insurance
Although legislation that would have provided federal insurance
without FHA's problems failed to be enacted, the discussions of the concepts of partial insurance and reliance upon the lenders' underwriting that
had taken place prior to the introduction of that proposed legislation had
resulted in acceptance of those concepts by the savings and loan industry.
While the opposition to FHA grew, the need for high ratio loans also
became apparent. These factors, in addition to more subtle ones such as
the confidence in big business as opposed to big government which was
prevalent during that era, resulted in receptivity to the concept of private
mortgage insurance, notwithstanding the pre-Depression experience." Thus,
the modem era of private mortgage insurance began in 1957 with the
chartering of Mortgage Guaranty Insurance Corporation (MGIC) under
the laws of Wisconsin. Since that time, numerous states have authorized
the chartering of private mortgage insurance companies, and the number
of companies has continued to grow. At present there are twenty mortgage
C.

x1 Id.
'2Id.

at 54.

is Id.
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insurance companies which have been deemed qualified by the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation.'
Since the founding of MGIC in 1957, the private mortgage industry
has experienced tremendous growth, both absolutely and in the share of
the mortgage insurance market occupied by private mortgage insurance
as opposed to government mortgage insurance. Between 1960 and 1977
the amount of private mortgage insurance in force grew from $0.3 billion
to $63.0 billion, while the combined amount of the FHA and VA insurance
increased from $56.4 billion to $141.6 billion. 5 The percentage of total
outstanding mortgage debt on one to four family nonfarm homes which are
privately insured was 30.8% in 1977, compared with .5% in 1960.1" Most
of the mortgages covered by private mortgage insurance are originated by
savings and loan associations. At the end of 1978 65.5% of all mortgages
covered by private mortgage insurance were originated by savings and
loan associations, as compared with 20.7% by mortgage bankers, 8.1%
by commercial banks, 5.0% by mutual savings banks and 1.0% by
credit unions and others."
III.

OPERATION OF THE PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE INDUSTRY

Standardization of Operations and Practices
Although there are now a substantial number of private mortgage
insurance companies, the industry's operations and practices are highly
standardized. This standardization is due primarily to the following factors.
First, most of the major insurance companies belong to the mortgage
insurers' trade association, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America
(MICA), which publishes Operating Guidelines codifying procedural and
underwriting practices and criteria prevalent in the mortgage insurance
industry to which the members are encouraged to adhere. Second, the
eligibility requirements imposed by the Federal National Mortgage Association (FNMA) and FHLMC, as discussed below, have contributed to
standardization. A third factor has been the success of MGIC and its
initial dominant market position which enabled Wisconsin's legislation
permitting private mortgage insurance to become a model for other states
and MGIC to become a model for other insurers. As a result of these
factors, there are few variations among companies with regard to master
policy terms, underwriting standards and premiums.
A.

14See discussion in Section IV, infra.

15 Economic Report of the President 335 (January 1978); MICA Fact Book and Directory,

Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, at 8 (1978-1979).
18 Id.

17MICA Fact Book, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, supra note 15 at 5.
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The major underwriting effort takes place prior to the mortgage insurer's issuance of a master policy to the lender. Each lending institution
seeking status as an insured lender is required to submit an application
for a master policy, along with certain other documentation. Most mortgage
insurers require information on the lender's current financial status as
contained in its audited financial statements, the qualifications of the
lenders' appraisers, the size and composition of its residential loan portfolio, the volume of residential loan business done in the past, its methods
of servicing delinquent loans, and its regulatory status.18 The 1975 study
of the mortgage insurance industry submitted by Arthur D. Little, Inc.
to FNMA and FHLMC found that these requirements are typically applied
more stringently to lenders that are not regulated by federal or state government." If the mortgage insurer determines that the lender meets the eligibility criteria contained in its lender qualification procedures, a master
policy is then issued which entitles the lender to submit individual loans
for insurance.
The mortgage insurer determines the lender's continuing eligibility
by reviewing the lender's regular performance report and by spot checks
of the lender's appraisal program and of credit reports submitted by the
lender in connection with individual applications for insurance.2" In the
event that an insured lender's performance is inadequate, the mortgage
insurer may increase the care with which it underwrites loans submitted
by that lender, engage in lender education or ultimately cancel the lender's
master policy. This last option has no effect upon insurance already in force.
Once the master policy is in force, the insured lender may submit
applications for insurance on individual loans, along with information
concerning the property and the borrower. 2 ' However, the insurer relies
heavily upon the underwriting already performed by the lender which makes
the process of insuring individual loans a rapid one. According to the Authur
D. Little study, the surveyed mortgage insurance companies accepted or
22
rejected 60% to 90% of all loans submitted within one business day.
This very rapid service is in notable contrast with the thirty to forty-five
day lags that are not uncommon with FHA and VA, and is an important
factor in explaining lender preference for private mortgage insurance.
18 Operating Guidelines, Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, § 2.02 (July 1, 1978)

(hereinafter referred to as Operating Guidelines).
19 The Private Mortgage Insurance Industry - Report to the Federal National Mortgage

Association and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Arthur D. Little, Inc., at

17 (April 1975) (hereinafter referred to as A. D. Little, Inc. Report).
20 Operating Guidelines, at § 2.03.
221d. at §§ 3.10-.05.
2

2

A. D. Little, Inc., Report supra note 19 at 22.
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The costs of insurance are also standardized. Typically, one-half of
one percent of the loan amount is paid initially and one-fourth of one
percent annually for ten years. In return for this premium the top 20 or
25% of the loan, depending upon the policy, is insured.
B.

Competition within the Private Mortgage Insurance Industry
Because the product and price are virtually identical, competition
within the industry tends to focus upon other aspects of the business. Some
elements of the competition are harmless or even beneficial to the lender
and the insurer, such as rapid issuance of commitments upon submission
of loans by the lender, personal contacts between the insurer and the lender,
and secondary market services offered by the mortgage insurer to the lender.
However, another means of competing which is detrimental to mortgage
insurance companies and ultimately to the mortgage industry is the lowering
of the underwriting standards by the mortgage insurance companies. This
practice is frequently justified as necessary to the insurance industry because the loans rejected by one insurance company will be insured by
another company, while the first company which attempted to uphold
higher underwriting standards will not succeed in doing so, but will merely
lose the business. This tendency toward the lowest common denominator
is sometimes referred to as "post office box underwriting."
An additional practice widely acknowledged in the mortgage insurance
industry is the maintenance of compensating balances in lending institutions
in return for the institutions insuring loans with the mortgage insurance
company. Not only is this admitted, but a close correlation has been found
between assets so invested by a mortgage insurance company in any one
state and the volume of premiums written in that state." This practice
also results in a lowering of underwriting standards because the resulting
tie between the lender and the insurer creates a situation where the insurer is inclined to insure loans submitted by the lender without due regard
for their quality.
C. Competition with Government Insurance and Self-Insurance - The
Effect of Governmental Requirements
There is another aspect of competition in the mortgage insurance
industry besides competition among the private mortgage insurance
companies. The private mortgage insurance industry as a whole competes
with government insurance and self-insurance. The competitive advantages
held by the private mortgage insurance industry over government insurance
(FHA and VA), such as lower premiums, more rapid issuance of insurance
committments, and market interest rates, are outlined above. Statistics
23

1d. at 124.
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clearly show that the private mortgage insurance industry has steadily
gained ground in this competition. The other major source of competition
is self-insurance by the lender; the lender determines to bear the risk of
loss itself. Self-insurance by lenders is disadvantageous to the mortgage
insurance industry not only because the mortgage insurers lose the premiums
which would otherwise be paid by lenders, but also because of the adverse
selection problem. Lenders which prefer self-insurance do not generally
self-insure all loans, but only those they perceive to be of higher quality.
A pattern results whereby weaker loans tend to be submitted to the mortgage insurance companies. However, at the same time government insurance
creates competition for the private mortgage insurance industry, federal
statutes and regulations promulgated by the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board assist the private mortgage insurance industry in its competition
with self-insurance, by facilitating through statutes or regulations the making
of higher ratio loans when the top portion is covered by private mortgage
insurance.
The Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970 ' has also had substantial
impact upon the private mortgage insurance industry. Title II of that Act
amended the Federal National Mortgage Association's charter 5 (FNMA)
to authorize FNMA to provide a secondary market for conventional
mortgages. While FNMA had previously been limited to the purchase and
sale of government insured mortgage loans (FHA an VA), Title H
amended FNMA's charter to permit purchase and sale of conventional
mortgages. Title II, however, further provided that no conventional mortgage could be purchased if the outstanding principal balance of the
mortgage at the time of purchase exceeded 75 % of the value of the property
securing the mortgage unless: (A) the seller retained a participation interest
of not less than 10% in the mortgage; (B) the seller agreed to repurchase
or replace the mortgage upon demand of the corporation in the event that
the mortgage was in default; or (C) that portion of the unpaid principal
balance of the mortgage which was in excess of 75% was guaranteed or
insured by a qualified private insurer as determined by FNMA.26 This
section was amended in 1974 to impose these limitations when the loan
to value ratio exceeded 80% rather than 75%, and to require when the
insurance option was taken that the unpaid balance of the loan in excess
of 80% rather than 75% be covered by insurance. 7
Title Im of the Emergency Home Finance Act of 1970, known as
24
25
26

Pub. L. 91-351, 84 Stat. 450 (1970) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1717, 1454).
12 U.S.C. § 1717 (1979).

1d.

Id.
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss4/2
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the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Act, created the Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation. Title Ill contained a provision which
was virtually identical to Title II's provision with regard to FNMA. FHLMC
was prohibited from purchasing a conventional mortgage if the outstanding
principal balance of the mortgage at the time of purchase exceeded 75%
of the value of the property securing the mortgages unless: (A) the seller
retained a participation interest of not less than ten percent in the mortgage;
(B) the seller agreed to repurchase or replace the mortgage upon demand
of the corporation in the event that the mortgage was in default; or (C)
that portion of the unpaid principal balance of the mortgage which was
in excess of 75% was guaranteed or insured by a qualified private insurer
as determined by FHLMC.'8 This section was also amended in 1974 to
impose these limitations only when the loan to value ratio exceeded 80%
rather than 75%, and to require when the insurance option was taken
that the unpaid principal balance of the loan in excess of 80% rather
than 75% be covered by insurance."9
While the statute permitted two alternatives to mortgage insurance
when a loan exceeds 80% of value, FHLMC has adopted more stringent
requirements for its own protection when purchasing a loan which exceeds
that percentage. FHLMC's "Sellers' Guide - Conventional Mortgages"
sets forth requirements for all conventional loans purchased by FHLMC
and constitutes part of the contract with regard to each loan purchased.
The Sellers' Guide requires mortgage insurance issued by an FHLMC
approved mortgage insurer on all mortgage loans that have a loan to
value ratio in excess of 80%.10 Coverage is required on the amount in
excess of 75% of value, and must remain in force until the mortgage
loan is reduced to 80% of the original value, at which time it may be
cancelled. Although FHLMC purchases participation interests in which
the loan's seller retains a participation interest of 10% or more, this retained interest by the seller does not constitute a substitute for mortgage
insurance under FHLMC requirements, notwithstanding the provisions of
§ 1454 (a) (2) (C). 1' It is not feasible for FHLMC to adopt the option
set forth in § 1454 (a) (2) (B) of the statute whereby the seller of a loan in
82
excess of 80% agrees to repurchase the loan in the event of default.
Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) Insurance Regulations prohibit federally insured savings and loan associations from selling loans or
28

12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(2) (1970).

29

Id.

80

Sellers' Guide - Conventional Mortgages, Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corp., §
3.201(c).
81 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(2)(c) (1979).
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interests in loans with recourse. 3 A requirement of repurchase by the seller
upon default would constitute a with recourse transaction pursuant to
the definition contained in the regulations.3 " Because a substantial portion
of sellers of loans to FHLMC would thus be prohibited from exercising
this option, FHLMC has not considered adopting this alternative administratively.
Both governmentally chartered corporations providing a secondary
market for conventional mortgage loans are authorized to establish
standards for the qualifications of the mortgage insurers which insure the
top risk portion of high ratio loans, and both corporations have done so.
However, the private mortgage insurance industry is relatively more important to FHLMC than to FNMA; a far higher percentage of the loans
purchased by FNMA are government insured than is the case for FHLMC.
FHLMC was created a part of the Federal Home Loan Bank system 5 and was
authorized to deal only with federally insured depository institutions.
FHLMC has therefore tended to focus its purchase programs on the types
of loans originated by the savings and loan associations and other depositing institutions. These institutions originate very few government insured loans. FNMA, in contrast, has dealt mainly with mortgage bankers
which are not depository institutions and which have originated mainly
FHA/VA loans. Recent statutory and economic developments (which are
beyond the scope of this article) have altered FHLMC's seller base and
the percentage of FHA/VA loans delivered to FNMA. These developments
will probably tend to make private mortgage insurance as important to
FNMA as it is to FHLMC.
Federal regulations as well as federal statutes have contributed to
the growth of the mortgage insurance industry. Since 1971, FHLBB regulations applicable to federally chartered savings and loan associations have
permitted such institutions to make home mortgage loans of up to 95%
of the value of the security property provided that either: (1) "the association establishes and maintains a specific reserve with respect to such
loan equal to one percent of the unpaid principal balance until the unpaid
principal balance has been reduced to an amount not in excess of 90%
of the value or purchase price of the real estate security, whichever is
321d. at § 1454(a)(2)(b).
3 12 C.F.R. § 563.23 (1978).
34 Id. at § 561.8.
35 Pursuant to the FHLMC Act, FHLMC is under the direction of a Board of Directors
composed of the members of the FHLBB, and the Chairman of the FHLBB is the Chairman
of FHLMC. FHLMC is a member of each Federal Home Loan Bank. The capital stock
of the Corporation consists of non-voting common stock, which is issued only to Federal
Home Loan Banks, 12 U.S.C. § 1454 (1979).
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less, determined at the time the loan was made;""6 or (2) that as long
as the unpaid balance of the loan is in excess of 90% of the value or
purchase price of the real estate security, the amount which is in excess
of an amount equal to 80% of the value or purchase price of the real
estate security is guaranteed or insured by a mortgage insurance company
which has been determined to be a qualified private insurer by FHLMC."
The same requirements were established for federally insured associations
in 1974.38 The specific reserve requirement is extremely expensive to the
lender. Therefore, on nearly all loans in excess of 90% of value made
by savings and loan associations that are either federally chartered or
federally insured, the borrower is required to obtain private mortgage insurance written by a mortgage insurer approved by FHLMC pursuant to
the eligibility requirements set forth below, as a condition to the lender's
granting the loan.
IV.

INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL SECONDARY MARKET

AND THE PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE INDUSTRY

FNMA and FHLMC Eligibility Requirements for Mortgage Insurers
in General
FNMA and FHLMC, have been authorized by Congress to purchase
high ratio conventional loans insured by private mortgage insurers they deem
to be qualified, proceeded to establish standard as to what constitutes a
qualified insurer. While the area was a new one for federal involvement,
a number of states had established statutory and regulatory requirements
applicable to the mortgage insurance industry which were aimed at avoiding
the problems that had caused the demise of the mortgage guaranty industry
in the 1930's. FNMA and FHLMC requirements were initially based upon
those contained in the various state laws. However, the corporations' requirements were more stringent and comprehensive than state laws in such
areas as minimum capital, geographic diversity of risk, and right to control
and review of mortgage underwriting practices. Subsequent amendments
exceed state requirements even further, reflecting developments in and
experience with the mortgage insurance industry.
A.

There are two basic concerns addressed through requirements placed
upon mortgage insurers: (1) to ensure quality underwriting to deminish
the likelihood that the loan will go into default and the insurer will be
required to pay a claim; and (2) to ensure the financial solidity of the
insurer so that if the insured loan does go into default, the insurer has
36 12 C.F.R. § 545.6 1(a)(5)(v)(b)

(1978).

a71d. at 1(a)(5)(v)(a).
38ld. at § 563.9 7(a).
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the resources to pay the claim. State requirements are primarily financial
while the initial FNMA and FHLMC requirements were primarily aimed
at ensuring the financial solidity of the insurer. FNMA requirements have
remained primarily financial, while FHLMC's requirements have been
altered over time to address the underwriting concern as well.
FNMA's requirements are contained in the application for approval
itself, a four page form entitled "Request for Determination of Qualification
of Private Mortgage Insurer." The standards are written primarily in
terms of guidelines and suggestions rather than absolute requirements or
prohibitions. The preface states that determinations as to whether applicants are qualified mortgage insurers will be individually made,"9 and the
bulk of the guidelines consists of a listing of the considerations used in
making that determination. Mortgage insurers which have a meaningful
business history and substantial experience are expected to have a policyholders' surplus (capital plus surplus plus contingency reserve) of not less than
$2,000,000 at the time the application is submitted which will be increased
within a reasonable period of time to $5,000,000. Those without such
history and experience are expected to meet the $5,000,000 requirement
at the time the application is submitted. "° The relationship between the
total liability of the mortgage insurer under all policies and the policyholders' surplus is considered by FNMA, and generally should not exceed
a twenty-five to one ratio."1 The mortgage insurer's general financial
solidity is also determined from audited financial statements, annual reports to stockholders, and similar sources, which are also required to be
submitted with the application for approval by FNMA. 2
While the emphasis of the FNMA requirements is upon the financial
strength of the mortgage insurer, there are also certain requirements or
guidelines in the area of general business practices and underwriting practices. In order to obtain approval by FNMA, the mortgage insurer must
be licensed to do business in at least one state.," It is preferred, although
not absolutely required, that the principal insurance activity of the mortgage
insurer be insuring against financial loss resulting from nonpayment of the
mortgages and deeds of trust on residential structures." Payment of kickbacks to a lender in return for that lender's placing of insurance with the
mortgage insurer is prohibited, and violation of this prohibition is a ground
39 Request for Determination of Qualification of Private Mortgage Insurer, Federal National

Mortgage Ass'n, at 1.
1.
401d. at 1,
41Id. at
92Id. at

1, 2.
2-3.
4 ld. at 2, 1 4.
" Id.at 1, 2.
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for disqualification." In the underwriting area, the mortgage insurer is required to demonstrate, prior to FNMA approval, that its staff possesses the
technical expertise to underwrite mortgage loans."8 Subsequent to approval,
the mortgage insurer must agree to permit periodic audits by FNMA of
its operating policies and procedures, as well as its financial records.",
However, while the mortgage insurer's policies and procedures are subject
to scrutiny by FNMA, the standards give no guidance with regard to required operational and business practices, other than the prohibition on
kickbacks.
FHLMC also established standards which mortgage insurers are required to meet in order to achieve and maintain the status of a qualified
private insurer. Because the FHLMC requirements are far more formal
and detailed than FNMA's and because private mortgage insurance issues
are currently more central to FHLMC's operations than to FNMA's the
remainder of this article will focus upon FHLMC's requirements.
B.

FHLMC Eligibility Requirements
The FHLMC Board of Directors adopted its first "Eligibility Requirement for Private Mortgage Insurers" in 1971. Except that the requirements were clearly mandatory standards and not guidelines or exhortations to the industry, many of the initial FHLMC requirements were substantially simlar to FNMA's, emphasizing financial solidity rather than
quality underwriting. Like FNMA, FHLMC established a minimum capital
requirement of $5,000,000, but provided some leniency in the case of
companies which had an established record. Companies which had been
in business prior to 1971 could, in FHLMC's discretion, be given fortyeight months from the time of application to meet the requirements.' s
Again similar to FNMA's requirements, the insurer's outstanding liability
could not exceed twenty-five times its policyholders' surplus. "9 The insurer
was required, not merely encouraged, to limit its business to the insurance
against loss by reason of nonpayment of indebtedness secured by mortgages
or deeds of trust on residential structures.5" Kickbacks to lenders in connection with the placement of insurance by that lender were prohibited. 5 1
Copies of reports filed by the mortgage insurer with state insurance regulatory authorities, shareholders and the Securities and Exchange CommisBId. at 2,

4

6.

"AId. at 1, 3.
47 Id. at 3-4.
48 Eligibility Requirements for Private Mortgage Insurers, "Financial Requirements," Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corp. (1971) at 1 1.
9
ld. at "Operational," 2.
41
50 Id. at "Basic Requirements," 3.
51 Id. at "Operational," 1 3.

Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 1979

17

Akron Law Review, Vol. 12 [1979], Iss. 4, Art. 2
AKRON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 12:4

sion were required to be submitted to FHLMC in addition to copies of
audit reports submitted to the mortgage insurer by state insurance examiners.5" FHLMC also reserved the right to audit the approved insurer and
to require such certificates as were deemed necessary to demonstrate the
mortgage insurer's compliance with FHLMC's requirements.5"
However, FHLMC's requirements even in the early days went beyond FNMA's in several ways. There were additional requirements aimed
at adequate financial solidity in the event the insured mortgage went into
default. The establishment of the contingency reserve in an amount equal
to 50% of earned premiums was required." The insurer was required to
maintain an adequate loss reserve," and at least 85% of the insurer's
total assets were required to be maintained in marketable securities and
other highly liquid investments. 56 Losses in excess of 35% per year in
two consecutive years would result in suspension."7 FHLMC imposed some
additional business requirements. FHLMC attempted to protect the insurer, and thus the lender and ultimately itself, from an overconcentration
of risk by prohibiting the insurance of loans secured by properties in a
single housing tract or continuous tracts in excess of 10% of the policyholders' surplus.' The insurer's risk for each loan was required to be
limited to a maximum of 20% of the borrower's indebtedness to the insured, and the insurer was required to retain the right of election to pay
the contractual portion or to pay the full amount of the loss and take title
to the property. 9 Finally, prior to FHLMC approval, the insurer was required to be licensed to do business in three states, rather than in one as
required by FNMA. 0 Thus, the FHLMC approved insurers had also met
the statutory or regulatory requirements of at least three other jurisdictions.
However, while FHLMC had somewhat more stringent requirements
than FNMA, the requirements were substantially similar in content and
level of detail. The focus of the requirements imposed by both corporations
was upon the insurer's assets to assure that in the event of loss from default by the borrower, the insurer had the resources to pay the claim. In
1971, little attention was given to the issue of how to prevent loss by
assuring that the loans insured by the mortgage insurer were of sufficiently
Id. at
3 Id. at
54 Id. at
55
Id.at
56 Id: at
5T Id. at
5
8Id.at
59 Id. at
60 Id. at
52

5

"Reports and Certificates,"
2.
4-5.
"Financial Requirements,"
3.
4.
5.
"Operational,"
4.
5.
"Basic Requirements,"
1.
"Operational,"
1.
"Basic Requirements,"
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high quality to avoid a percentage of defaults so high that the mortgage
insurer's financial solidity, and thus its ability to pay claims, was impaired. Further, both corporations established the right to oversee the
mortgage insurer's business, but the scope of that oversight was not
clearly defined.
A major revision of the "FHLMC Eligibility Requirements for Private
Mortgage Insurers," adopted by the Board of Directors in June of 1973
put the requirements essentially into their present form."' These 1973
eligibility requirements were far more detailed than the prior ones. The
focus was no longer primarily upon financial requirements. Instead, the
requirements imposed upon mortgage insurers seeking to achieve and maintain approved status were divided into several areas: financial, business,
underwriting and administration.
The financial requirements, aimed at insuring the solidity of the mortgage insurer so FHLMC would be assured of the mortgage insurer's
ability to pay claims, remained virtually identical to the financial requirements previously in effect."2
The business requirements also remained very similar, with one major
exception. " A new diversity requirement was added to the previously
existing limitation upon the amount of insurance that could be written for
properties in a single housing tract or continguous housing tracts. Under
the new diversity requirement, no mortgage insurer was permitted to have
more than 20% of its total insurance in force in any one Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), or more than 60% of its insurance in
force in one state."4 The Board of Directors retained authority to alter
these percentages in particular cases upon a determination that the economic
condition of the SMSA's or the states in which an insurer has insurance in
force or certificates of authority require such alteration. This additional
requirement was based upon a recognition of the fact that defaults by
mortgagors frequently occur because of a downturn in local economic
conditions with resulting unemployment. This risk is not totally alleviated
by careful underwriting of the insured lender or individual loans. The
requirement that the mortgage insurer's risk be diversified geographically
represents an attempt to decrease the likelihood that the mortgage insurer
will be called upon to pay claims in excess of its ability to do so, even
assuming it has met FHLMC's requirements of financial solidity. Under
e1 Eligibility Requirements for Private Mortgage Insurers, Federal Home Loan Mortgage

Corp. (1973).
62id. at § 130.
e3 Id.at § 120.
e 4 Id. at § 120.3.
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the amended eligibility requirements, the mortgage insurer is no longer
required to possess a certificate of authority in three states, but is simply
required to have the certificates of authority necessary to meet the geographical diversity requirements.
The most significant aspect of the 1973 revisions as they relate to
requirements imposed upon mortgage insurers was the addition of a section
setting forth underwriting requirements.6 5 This represented the first attempt
to diminish the likelihood of losses occurring from defaults by requiring
the insurer to follow specified good business practice, as opposed simply
to imposing financial requirements to increase the likelihood that the insurer would be able to pay the claim should default occur. These requirements, unlike the financial requirements, have a substantial impact upon
the relationship between the mortgage insurer and the insured lender.
As previously discussed, the standard practice in the mortgage insurance industry is to perform a detailed analysis of the lender prior to
issuing it the master policy, after which the insurer relies primarily upon
the insured lender's underwriting of individual loans. The FHLMC requirements related primarily to master policy underwriting. The 1973
eligibility requirements provided that prior to insuring loans for a particular
lender, the insurer must thoroughly investigate and evaluate the lender."
The areas of required investigation included the lender's underwriting
capacity in terms of the quality of the lender's appraisal and underwriting
ability; the lender's net worth; the quality of the lender's assets; the ability
and past performance of the lender's servicing staff; and the adequacy of the
lender's servicing procedures. No substantive standards were set by FHLMC
with regard to acceptable lender quality or performance. The mortgage
insurer was required to prepare and retain a report indicating that the investigation was made, and containing all information received in the course
of the investigation, and including the insurer's judgment or evaluation of
each factor. The information obtained in the course of the initial evaluation
was required to be updated at least once every two years. "7 The initial and
ongoing investigation requirements were the same regardless of whether
the lender was a governmentally regulated institution. As under the pre1973 eligibility requirements, the only requirements regarding the contents
of the master policy were the limitations on the insurer's risk per loan
(25% of the entire indebtedness to the insured) and the insurer's right
of election."
Id.
ee1d.
671d.
68 Id.
65

at § 125.

at § 125.2(a).
at § 125.2(b).
at § 125.1.
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The requirements for underwriting individual loans were phrased
primarily in terms of the information the insurer must collect from the
lender prior to determining whether to insure a particular loan. Determinations as to how to evaluate the information remained in the discretion of
the insurer. The mortgage loan underwriting process falls into two basic
areas: (1) the evaluation of the borrower's credit to determine the likelihood
of repayment of the loan, and (2) the appraisal of the mortgaged property
to determine whether the value of the security is adequate to protect the
lender in the event the borrower defaults. In the first area, if the loan to
value ratio exceeded 90% and the property was within an SMSA, FHLMC
required the insurer to obtain a "Factual Data Credit Report" on the form
prescribed by FHLMC.69 Otherwise, the insurer was required merely to
obtain a written credit report, which could be prepared by the lender, containing sufficient information on the borrower's employment status and
credit history upon which to base an informed credit decision."0 The insurer was similarly required to obtain an appraisal report containing sufficient information upon which to base an independent judgment of the
value of the security property. 1 If the property was located in an SMSA,
the appraisal was required to contain a stated value based upon the market
approach and supported by a comparison of at least three comparable
properties."2 In all cases, the insurer was required to obtain at least one
clear photograph of the security property. Finally, the insurer was required to develop a program for testing and evaluating appraisals the insurer
received from the lender."' Specified appraisal and credit information on
each insured loan was required to be maintained by the lender as part of
the insured mortgage record.'4
An additional provision in the underwriting area dealt not with collection of data, but rather was intended to assure the integrity of the underwriting process itself. This provision required separation of the insurer's
underwriting and sales functions. Employees of the insurer who were responsible for insurance sales were prohibited from underwriting, approving
insurance or testing the insurer's appraisal methods."
The final area in which the 1973 revisions to the eligibility requirements expanded the mortgage insurer's obligations was administrative requirements. The revised requirements retained the pre-1973 requirement
691d. at § 125.4(a).
70 Id. at § 125.4(b).
71Id. at § 125.3(a).
72 Id. at § 125.3(b).
73ld. at § 125.3(c).
7
4Id. at § 125.5(c).
75
Id. at § 125.5(a).
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that the mortgage insurer file with FHLMC a copy of reports made by
the insurer to state insurance regulatory authorities, stockholders and the
Securities and Exchange Commission, as well as a copy of audit reports
submitted to the mortgage insurer by state insurance examiners. The 1973
amendments also required mortgage insurers to file with FHLMC annual
and quarterly reports on forms prescribed by FHLMC, in addition to any
other reports which might be required. 6 It was made clear that continual
compliance with the eligibility requirements was required, and the mortgage insurer must retain for at least three years documents and records
necessary to demonstrate such continual compliance. All the mortgage insurer's records, underwriting practices and claims practices were specifically
made subject to audit by FHLMC, and each auditor's daily fee of two
hundred dollars plus expenses was established. Finally, annual submission
by the insurer of a "Certificate of Compliance" with FHLMC requirements
was required.7"
Although the primary result of the 1973 revisions to the eligibility
requirements was the expansion in scope and detail of the requirements
imposed by FHLMC upon mortgage insurers, an additional result was the
placement of requirements and limitations upon FHLMC itself. FHLMC
has no de jure authority to regulate mortgage insurers. Its power, as granted
in Section 305 (a) (2) of the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Act,"8 is merely the power to determine whether loans insured by a particular mortgage insurer will be deemed eligible for purchase by FHLMC,
i.e., the power any purchaser has to determine whether the goods offered
for sale to that purchaser meet its requirements. Further, FHLMC is not
subject to the requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act." However,
FHLMC decided that despite these statutory provisions, it should concern
itself with various due process issues. Therefore, the 1973 revisions to the
eligibility requirements contained new provisions designed to grant certain
procedural due process safeguards to mortgage insurers which applied for
or sought to retain approved status.
Beginning in March 1972, mortgage insurers which applied for
qualification but were denied approval by FHLMC were notified in writing
of the reasons for disapproval. The mortgage insurer was then given an
opportunity to be heard by the Executive Vice President of FHLMC (its
then most senior officer) on the merits of the grounds cited for failure to
Id. at § 170.
at § 180.
78 12 U.S.C. § 1454 (1979).
795 U.S.C. H9 551-59 (1977).
7,

77Id.
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qualify. 0 This constituted the extent of the disappointed applicant's due
process right. The procedures whereby the mortgage insurer was to apply
for a hearing and procedures whereby the hearing was to be conducted
were not set forth.
While due process at the application stage was not detailed in the pre1973 eligibility requirements, due process prior to suspension or disqualification of a mortgage insurer previously approved was totally absent. The
requirements in effect prior to the 1973 revisions contained only one specific reference to suspension: a mortgage insurer which experienced losses
in excess of the permissible loss ratio was suspended from qualification
until it was recertified by FHLMC. However, the possibility of suspension
was implicit in the prior eligibility requirements because the continual compliance provisions would have been meaningless if FHLMC had not had
the power to suspend a mortgage insurer for noncompliance which occurred
subsequent to initial approval. However, the availability of notice and
hearing prior to suspension were not set forth.
The 1973 revisions substantively increased and explicitly stated the
availability of procedural due process. Under the revised requirements, responsibility for daily dealings with the mortgage insurers was delegated by
the Board of Directors to the management of FHLMC, whereas decision
making authority regarding a mortgage insurer's approved status was retained by the Board.81 Thus, under the revised eligibility requirements, a
mortgage insurer could no longer be approved or suspended at the discretion of FHLMC's Executive Vice President. Instead, these actions could
only be taken at a higher level through affirmative votes of at least two
of the three members of the Board of Directors. Further protection was
provided in that the process by which the Board would make its decision
together with the mortgage insurer's rights in the event it was dissatisfied
with the decision were explicitly set forth.
In the matter of the initial determination of approval, under the revised eligibility requirements, application for approval was required to be
made to the Board of Directors for its determination whether the applicant
was to be deemed an eligible private mortgage insurer.8 2 If the decision
was negative, the mortgage insurer then had thirty days from the date of
receipt of the Board's decision to file a notice with the Board objecting
to the decision and requesting a hearing in accordance with the procedures
80 Eligibility Requirements for Private Mortgage Insurers, Federal Home Loan Mortgage

Corp., "Basic Requirements,"
2. (1972).
s8 Eligibility Requirements for Private Mortgage Insurers, Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corp., § 100.2 (1973).
821d. at § 110.1-.2.
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set forth in the eligibility requirements.8" Likewise, the Board of Directors
retained the authority to decide whether a mortgage insurer should retain
approved status, be disqualified or suspended.8" The mortgage insurer was
granted the right to file a written request for a hearing within thirty days
of a Board suspension or disqualification order, as well as the right to request a stay of the order pending such hearing.8 5 Finally, the mortgage insurer was explicitly given the right to apply to the Board of Directors for
a waiver of any requirement set forth in the eligibility requirements as
well as the right to a hearing if the application for waiver was denied.'
The Board also retained the right to waive any requirement on its own
initiative.8"
The procedures applicable to the conduct of these hearings were also
set forth in the 1973 revisions to the eligibility requirements. If a hearing
was requested by a mortgage insurer pursuant to any of the provisions set
forth above, the Board of Directors was required to establish a hearing
date no more than sixty days after receiving such request.s" The hearing
was to be conducted by the presiding officer designated by the Board,
who was given the responsibility for conducting the hearing in a fair and
impartial manner. 9 The presiding officer's powers included: requiring the
production of documents, receiving the ruling upon the admissibility of
evidence, taking depositions or causing them to be taken, holding settlement conferences and ruling upon motions other than a motion to dismiss or one which would result in a final determination on the merits.
All parties were given the right to submit oral or documentary evidence
and to conduct cross-examination. Hearings were to be recorded and the
record made available to any party. The presiding officer was then required within thirty days to certify the record, including his or her recommendation, to the Board for decision. 1 The Board was then required to
render a decision within forty-five days.92
After the 1973 revisions, no further revisions were made to the eligibility requirements for over five years. During this time, however, the mortgage insurance industry experienced substantial growth and FHLMC's
83Id. at
84 Id. at
85
Id.at
8ld. at
87
Id.at
88
1d. at
89
1d. at
90
1d.at
1Id. at
9
2 Id. at

§ 110.3.
§ 200.1.
§ 200.2-.3.
§ 190.1-.2.
§ 190.3.
§ 210.3.
§ 210.4.
§ 210.6.
§ 210.7.
§ 210.8.
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experience with the industry increased as well. Thus, by 1978, certain
amendments to the eligibility requirements were believed to be needed in
order to incorporate the results of this experience and to bring the requirements more into line with actual practices in the mortgage insurance
industry. The 1978 amendments increased the stringency of the requirements where necessary to deter harmful competitive practices and to
provide additional flexibility where appropriate. These amendments fell
into the following basic areas: master policy underwriting (investigation
of the lender), appraisal requirements for individual loans submitted by
the insured lender, conflict of interest prohibitions and sanctions which
could be imposed upon mortgage insurers found to be in violation of the
eligibility requirements. No changes in the financial requirements, business
requirements, or in the hearing procedures were deemed necessary despite
the passage of time since the requirements had been adopted.
A number of mortgage insurers had complained for several years about
the difficulties in complying with the requirements for initial investigation
and evaluation of the lender. They had found it difficult to investigate and
evaluate the lenders' underwriting capacity, net worth, and quality or
assets, ability and past performance of its servicing staff, and the adequacy
of its servicing procedures because the lender frequently refused to provide
the necessary information. If the mortgage insurer demanded the information as a condition to insuring loans, the lender merely threatened to
insure its loans elsewhere. The initial investigation requirement was therefore perceived as favoring the larger and more established insurers which
generally had this information on the lenders with which they dealt, at
the expense of newer insurers which did not have the information and
were unable to require it without losing their competitive position.
In order to deal with this problem, an amendment was adopted
which abolished the requirement that the mortgage insurer obtain the
specified information prior to insuring loans with a particular lender. The
amendment instead encouraged the mortgage insurer to investigate and
evaluate the lender as to those factors. If the mortgage insurer was unable
to obtain the necessary information from the lender, the insurer's files had
to demonstrate that reasonable efforts had been made to obtain the documentation. Further, the mortgage insurer was required to develop a system
whereby a sufficient number of loans submitted by the lender were reviewed in adequate detail to ensure their quality.9 In addition, rather
than conducting a new investigation every two years as previously required,
the 1978 revision required the mortgage insurer to maintain and update
osEligibility Requirements for Private Mortgage Insurers, Federal Home Loan Mortgage

Corp., § 125.2(a) (1978).
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at least quarterly certain statistics regarding its business with each lender.
This procedure would enable the insurer to evaluate each lender's quality
of underwriting and appraisal capacity, net worth and quality of assets,
ability and performance of the servicing staff, and the adequacy of servicing
procedures." This continual analysis of the insurer's business relationship
with the lender had become a fairly standard procedure in the mortgage
insurance industry aided by the increasing mechanization of that industry.
An additional advantage was that even if the lender refused to provide
relevant information, the mortgage insurer would not be precluded from
complying with this eligibility requirement because the information could
be obtained from the lender through the insurer's analysis of its business
with that lender. FHLMC thus continued its requirement that the mortgage
insurer obtain the information needed to ensure that the loans insured
were of sufficiently high quality without imposing an unfair burden upon
newer mortgage insurers, and facilitated compliance with the eligibility
requirements without damaging the insurer's competitive position.
The appraisal requirements supporting the underwriting approval of
mortgage insurance upon a particular property were greatly expanded to
detail precisely what mortgage insurers were to require from lenders whose
loans they insured. The revised provision also conformed, to the extent
possible, the FHLMC requirements for mortgage insurers to the FHLBB
requirements for FSLIC insured lenders.9" However, while the revised
provision set forth more detailed and stringent standards, it also provided
greater flexibility. A provision was added to make it clear that in determining the adequacy of a mortgage insurer's appraisal procedures,
FHLMC would consider factors relating to the individual insured lender,
the individual loan in question, and the nature and experience of the insurer's dealings with the lender. 6 This new provision reflected a recognition
that the adequacy of a particular appraisal was to some extent determined
by the situation. A loan submitted by a large and well established lender
with which the insurer had a long history of successful dealing would
realistically require a lesser degree of scrutiny than that of a small new
lender with which the insurer had never before dealt. Therefore, an appraisal report deemed inadequate in the latter situation might be perfectly
acceptable in the former.
The 1978 revisions to the eligibility requirements included a provision aimed at dealing with the previously discussed problem of the
941d. at § 125.2(b).
951d. at § 125.3(a).
96Id. at § 125.3(b).
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placement of compensating balances.17 The payment of kickbacks continued to be prohibited by the conflict of interest provisions. In addition,
under the revised conflict of interest section, a mortgage insurer, its parent
or another affiliate of the parent was prohibited from placing or maintaining funds on deposit with a lender with which the insurer has insured loans
for the purpose of inducing the lender to insure loans with the insurer.
Because the motive of inducement is difficult to prove, the section also
provided that with the exception of commercial checking accounts and
normal deposits in support of an active bank line of credit (where the
lender receives a direct business benefit from the deposit) any deposit by
an insurer placed or maintained with a lender is subject to full disclosure
to FHLMC upon request. If the facts disclosed indicate a violation, FHLMC
can then take appropriate action. In this manner, FHLMC attempted to
strike an appropriate balance, by retaining appropriate authority to deal
with harmful competitive practices without interfering with legitimate
business relationships.
Finally, in 1978 a new section was added to the eligibility requirements
making it clear that FHLMC had the power to deal with violations of the
eligibility requirements other than by suspension or disqualification of the
mortgage insurer. 8 FHLMC may give an informal warning to the insurer
expressing concerns and suggesting possible remedial action. A formal
written warning may also be given requiring corrective action and giving
the mortgage insurer a specified amount of time in which to take such
action. A copy of this warning will be given to the insurer's board of
directors. Finally, the insurer may be suspended or disqualified in accordance with the procedure set forth in the eligibility requirements. These revisions, in effect, merely codified prior existing practice. It was not uncommon in the course of the annual audit of a mortgage insurer for FHLMC
auditors to note violations of the eligibility requirements and set a time
limit for correcting the problem. Of course, explicit provision had been
made for suspension and disqualification prior to the 1978 revisions.
Previous Challenge to FHLMC Eligibility Requirements
While elaborate administrative hearing procedures are set forth in
the FHLMC eligibility requirements, the opportunity to use these procedures has arisen only once. In 1975, a mortgage insurer's application
for approval by FHLMC and simultaneous request for a waiver of certain
requirements were denied and the mortgage insurer requested a hearing
pursuant to the eligibility requirements. There resulted proceeding captioned In Re: Application of Mid Atlantic Mortgage Insurance, Inc., for
B.

97 Id. at § 150.2.

98 Id. at § 200.
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Waiver of the Five Million Dollar Minimum Capital Requirement Established by Section 130.1 of the Eligibility Requirements for Mortgage Insurers.9 9 This proceeding represents the only formal challenge made to
FHLMC's eligibility requirements in terms of FHLMC's authority to promulgate such requirements, the substance of the requirements themselves,
or the application of the substantive requirements to a particular factual
situation. There have been no cases in the suspension or disqualification
area, since no insurer has ever been suspended or disqualified.
Consideration of Mid Atlantic is instructive, not only because it
illustrates the operation of the hearing procedures, but because the decision
of the Board of Directors concisely sets forth FHLMC's statutory authority
to promulgate eligibility requirements for mortgage insurers and the
standard of proof that must be met by an insurer to overturn a requirement
established by FHLMC.
The following factual situation gave rise to the Mid Atlantic case.
Mid Atlantic Mortgage Insurance, Inc., a small mortgage insurer with
less than $1,000,000 in capital, applied for approval by FHLMC in
December 1974. It concurrently applied for a waiver of the minimum
capital requirement. FHLMC denied these applications in March 1975
and subsequently denied Mid Atlantic's request for reconsideration of the
decision. Mid Atlantic then requested a hearing which was granted. The
hearing was held in June 1975 before a presiding officer appointed by
the Board of Directors. 100
At the hearing Mid Atlantic raised essentially three issues. First, it
alleged that FHLMC lacked statutory authority to establish requirements,
including a minimum capital requirement, or to require that private mortgage insurers meet such requirements prior to being qualified by FHLMC.
Mid Atlantic contended that the Fedeal Home Loan Mortgage Corporation
Act did not authorize FHLMC to undertake a comprehensive regulation
of the industry. Instead, Mid Atlantic contended that FHLMC should rely
upon state regulation and approve any mortgage insurer licensed in the
state or states in which it transacted business. It cited the McCarranFerguson Act to support its contention that Congress had intended in
regulation of insurance to remain under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
states. However, the McCarran-Ferguson Act argument was not developed
beyond the mere statutory citation.'
In addition to contending that FHLMC lacked authority to promul99 (FHLBB 1975).
100 Id.
20 Id.

https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol12/iss4/2

28

Browne: Private Mortgage Insurance
Spring, 19791

PRIVATE MORTGAGE INSURANCE

gate its own eligibility requirements, Mid Atlantic took issue with the
substance of the requirements and the particular application of the requirements to Mid Atlantic. It contended that the $5,000,000 requirement was
an arbitrary and unreasonable one, citing the far lower minimum requirements imposed by the states. Mid Atlantic also contended that the requirement had an anticompetitive effect because it created a barrier to entry
of new companies into the market. Finally, the company contended that
even if the requirement itself were reasonable, it should have been waived
for Mid Atlantic. In support of this contention, Mid Atlantic cited compensating factors which provided adequate protection to FHLMC notwithstanding Mid Atlantic's limited capital. These factors included Mid
Atlantic's refusal to insure loans other than top quality ones, its membership in the Maryland Insurance Guarantee Association and its localized
10 2
approach to insurance.
All of these arguments were rejected by the presiding officer and
subsequently the Board of Directors. On the first issue, the presiding officer
found that the FHLMC Act gave FHLMC sufficient authority to establish
eligibility requirements as a prerequisite to approving a company as a
qualified private mortgage insurer, notwithstanding the fact that states
might impose less stringent requirements. This finding was accepted by
the Board of Directors and made a part of its decision."'
FHLMC's authority was found to be derived from several sections
in the FHLMC Act. First, the language in Section 305 (a) (2) which
permitted FHLMC to purchase conventional mortgages having a loan to
value ratio exceeding 80% if the unpaid principal balance of the mortgage
over 80% was guaranteed or insured by "a qualified insurer as determined
by the corporation," was found to indicate a Congressional intent to give
FHLMC broad discretion in establishing qualifications, including minimum
capital requirements. In addition, Section 305 (a) (1) which empowered
FHLMC to purchase and sell mortgages required that FHLMC's secondary
market operations "be confined so far as practicable to residential mortgages which are deemed by the corporation to be of such quality, type
and class as to meet generally and purchase standards imposed by private
institutional mortgage investors."' " By necessary implication, FHLMC is
required by this statutory provision to determine what types of mortgages
would be acceptable to private institutional mortgage investors, and then
to implement this determination by setting standards for the mortgages it
will purchase.
102

Id.

08

Id.

104 Id.
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The Board found that any doubt as to the extent of FHLMC's
authority to set such standards for mortgage insurers, notwithstanding
conflicting state law provisions, was resolved by the specific Congressional
directive in Section 310 of the FHLMC Act.1" 5 That section provides that
"powers and functions of the corporation and of the Board of Directors
shall be exercisable, and the provisions of this title shall be applicable and
effective, without regard to any other law."'0 6 The word "law" is defined
in Section 302 (c) of the FHLMC Act to include "any law of the United
States or of any State."' 7
The Board also found that the legislative history of the FHLMC Act
supported its conclusion that FHLMC had the statutory authority to promulgate standards for mortgage insurers, without regard to action or inaction on the part of states.' 8 The decision cited the provision in the
Conference Report which indicated a Congressional intent to allow participation by private mortgage insurance companies in FHLMC's secondary
market operations "under terms and conditions that require sound and
ethical practices."' 9 The Board concluded that this statement did not indicate any Congressional concern that FHLMC's secondary market activities
be restricted by state law. Damage to FHLMC's secondary market activities
could result if FHLMC sold securities supported by mortgage insurance
written by inadequately capitalized mortgage insurers. The Board was unwilling to infer a Congressional intent to hamstring the corporation's
secondary market activities." 0
The issue of whether the standards set by FHLMC had any anticompetitive effect was also examined. Contrary to Mid Atlantic's contention, it was found that competition in the mortgage insurance industry
had actually increased subsequent to FHLMC's adoption of eligibility requirements in 1971. The pattern of growing competition in the industry
did not indicate that the FHLMC requirements constituted a substantial
barrier to entry or hindrance to competition in the mortgage insurance
industry. 1 '
While FHLMC is not only authorized, but in effect required by
statute to set its own requirements without regard to the law or practice
of any state, FHLMC was not found by the Board to have total freedom
105 Id.
106

12 U.S.C. § 1454 (1979).

10 7Id. at § 1454(c).
1-8 (FHLBB 1975).
109 Id.
110 id.
111

Id.
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to establish requirements. In setting such requirements, FHLMC is not
permitted to act in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The presiding
officer found the minimum capital requirement was neither arbitrary nor
capricious, but was reasonable. This conclusion was accepted by the
Board.11
The amount of the minimum capital requirements was found to be
dictated largely by FHLMC's need to have its mortgage backed securities
find a ready acceptance in the capital market. Because FHLMC was organized with relatively little capital ($100,000,000), it is not in a position to
purchase mortgages and hold them in its portfolio, but must turn to the
capital markets. In order to raise capital, FHLMC must convince institutional investors that its mortgage backed securities are of unquestionable
quality, and an important element of this quality is the potential ability
of the insurer of the mortgages underlying the security to pay claims in
the event of default on the mortgages. The reasonableness of the minimum
capital requirement was therefore determined in light of the need to impress
potential investors with the soundness of an investment in FHLMC securities. The minimum capital requirements set by the various states were
found to be irrelevant to the reasonableness of FHLMC's standard because
unlike FHLMC, state authorities are not primarily concerned with selling
mortgage backed securities to private institutional investors."'
On the basis of all expert testimony in Mid Atlantic, it was found
that the $5,000,000 minimum capital requirement was necessary to enable
FHLMC to sell its securities and raise the necessary capital to continue its
mortgage purchase operations. There was testimony that the minimum
capital requirements imposed by private institutional investors were at least
as rigorous as FHLMC's. FHLMC's requirements could therefore be regarded as implementing the requirement of Section 305 (a) of the FHLMC
Act that FHLMC's mortgage purchases be confined to loans which "meet
generally the purchase standards imposed by private institutional mortgage
investors." Further, expert testimony backed by computer simulations indicated that the $5,000,000 capital requirement provided significantly
greater protection to FHLMC than would a lesser requirement. The requirement was therefore not arbitrary and capricious. In fact, the Board indicated that an even higher requirement such as $10,000,000 would also
be reasonable, but that the $5,000,000 requirement represented a balance
among competing considerations. The amount was low enough to permit
the number of private mortgage insurers to increase, but high enough to
Id.
I'8 Id.
112
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convince institutional investors that FHLMC securities are safe investments.1 1 4
On the final issue of whether Mid Atlantic should be granted a
waiver of the $5,000,000 capital requirement on the basis of the particular
facts involved, the presiding officer and subsequently the Board found no
merit in Mid Atlantic's contentions. 115
Mid Atlantic sought judicial review of the Board's decision by filing
suit in the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia." 6
FHLMC raised a jurisdictional objection contending that the case would
properly have been filed in the United States District Court, not the United
States Court of Appeals. These contentions resulted in a stipulated dismissal and the case was never refiled in the appropriate court. Thus, no
court has ever considered either the issue of FHLMC's authority to establish eligibility requirements for mortgage insurers or the issue of whether
particular requirements were arbitrary, capricious and therefore invalid.
D.

Potential Future Challenges to the FHLMC Eligibility Requirements
Because no court has had the opportunity to rule on the FHLMC
eligibility requirements, any discussion of a potential challenge to the requirements or the potential decision of a court is obviously speculative.
However, it is likely that a controversy over the eligibility requirements
would take one of two forms: a challenge to a specific requirement, as
being arbitrary or capricious as in Mid Atlantic; or a challenge to FHLMC's
authority to promulgate any requirements in view of the McCarranFerguson Act, a point raised in Mid Atlantic but not pursued.
Passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act" constituted an attempt by
Congress to deal with the respective powers of the state and federal governments to regulate the insurance business, an issue with which the courts
had been dealing for seventy-six years. From 1869 until 1944, the controlling case in the area was Paul v. Virginia,"8 a criminal case involving
prosecution for violation of a state criminal statute regulating insurance.
In that case, the Supreme Court upheld a Virginia statute requiring that
out-of-state insurance agents be licensed against a contention that the state
statute constituted a restraint on interstate commerce. In upholding the
statute and the defendant's conviction, the Court found first that issuing
insurance policies was not a transaction of commerce, but rather a contract
11 Id.
115 Id.
I's

Mid-Atlantic Mortgage Ins., Inc. v. FHLMC, No. 75-220 (D.C. Cir. 1975).

'IT15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-1015 (1964).
228 75 U.S. 357 (1869).
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of indemnity against loss.'19 The Court further found that because the
insurance policy did not take effect until delivered in Virginia, the transaction was purely intrastate.'
The courts followed this position until 1944 when United States v.
Southeastern Underwriter Association was decided.' 2 ' Defendants in that
case had been indicted for fixing fire insurance premiums in violation of
the Sherman Antitrust Act. 2 Defendants contended that they were not
required to conform to the business conduct standards required by the
Sherman Act because the business of fire insurance did not constitute commerce. "' The District Court agreed on the basis of Paul v. Virginia, and
dismissed the indictment.12 1 On direct appeal by the United States, the
Supreme Court held that fire insurance transactions across state lines constituted interstate commerce and reversed the District Court's dismissal
of the indictment.1 25 The Court distinguished the case from Paul and cases
following Paul on the grounds that in those prior cases the Commerce
Clause had been cited to attempt to strike down state regulation, whereas
in Southeastern Underwriters, the Commerce Clause was cited to uphold
a federal regulation and not to interfere with state regulation of the insurance industry.'
In reaction to the Southeastern Underwriter case, Congress enacted
the McCarran-Ferguson Act2 in 1945 to deal with resulting confusion
as to the proper role of the state and federal governments in regulating
insurance and to express an intent that regulation of insurance is the responsibility of the states unless Congress explicitly provides otherwise. The
McCarran-Ferguson Act provided that no act of Congress should be construed to invalidate, impair or supersede any law enacted by any state for
the purpose of regulating the business of insurance unless such act spe28
cifically related to the business of insurance.
The McCarran-Ferguson Act provides a defense against federal action
only if four conditions are met. First, the statute under which the challenged action is undertaken must not "specifically relate to the business of
119 Id. at 360.
2201d. at 361.
121322 U.S. 533 (1944).
122Id. at 534-35.
123 d. at 536.

124United States v. Southeastern Underwriters Ass'n, 51 F. Supp. 712 (D.D.C. 1943).

5322 U.S. 533 (1944).
Id. at 542-53.
127 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1964).
1281d. at § 1012.
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insurance." Second, the activities regulated must be part of the "business
of insurance." Third, the activities must be regulated by state law. Fourth,
action in question must "invalidate, impair, or supersede" state
the federal
29
law.1
Although in most McCarran-Ferguson Act cases there is no question
that a federal action, if otherwise applicable, will invalidate, impair, or
supersede state law, the issue is of prime significance in the case of the
FHLMC eligibility requirements. As previously discussed, FHLMC has
no regulatory authority over the mortgage insurance industry. FHLMC
cannot require a mortgage insurer to undertake or refrain from particular
acts and has no power to revoke a mortgage insurer's license to do business. Thus, regardless of any action by FHLMC, the rights private mortgage insurers may enjoy under state law are neither invalidated or impaired, and the state regimes are not superseded.
In contrast, virtually every case concerning the McCarran-Ferguson
Act involves efforts to prohibit activities permitted under state law. In
Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Securities, Inc.,' for
example, the Securities and Exchange Commission sought to prohibit an
insurance company merger approved by the State of Arizona. Similarly,
in Cochran v. Paco, Inc.,"' the plaintiff invoked the Truth in Lending Act
to prohibit use of an insurance financing disclosure statement which met
state law requirements. In Dexter v. Equitable Life Assurance Society,8 2
the plaintiff relied on federal antitrust laws to prohibit the tying of mortgage insurance to mortgage loans. Finally, in Group Life Health and Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.,"' the plaintiffs invoked the antitrust laws
to prohibit certain provided contracts between Blue Cross and pharmacies.
FHLMC simply cannot attempt any such prohibition under the eligibility
34
requirements.
As a practical matter, it might be argued that the FHLMC eligibility
requirements curtail activities permitted by state law. This argument would
be based upon the presumption that many mortgage originators will not
deal with insurers who fail to meet FHLMC standards. The validity of
the presumption is doubtful. There have been and presumably will be in
See, e.g., Securities Exchange Comm'n v. National Securities, Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969);
Cochran v. Paco, Inc., No. 76-1956 (5th Cir. Jan. 2, 1979).
129

180 393 U.S. 453

(1969).

131 No. 76-1956 (5th Cir. Jan. 2, 1979).
32527 F.2d 233 (2d Cir. 1975).
Is$99 S. Ct. 1067 (1979).
184 Indeed, in every case discussed in the text, the McCarran-Ferguson Act was raised as
a defense. Since FHLMC would never need to bring an enforcement action based on the
requirements, the Act would never be asserted as a defense.
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the future viable private mortgage insurers which have not applied for
approval under the eligibility requirements. However, even if the presumption is correct, the McCarran-Ferguson Act would not therefore be
applicable to the eligibility requirements. The impact of the requirements
on mortgage insurers would remain indirect and would depend upon the
intervening actions of totally autonomous third parties. In these circumstances, the requirements would not invalidate, impair, or supersede state
law, at least in the context in which those terms have been traditionally
understood.
If the eligibility requirements curtailed the actions of mortgage insurers, the question would arise whether the FHLMC Act falls within the
McCarran-Ferguson Act exemption for statutes which specifically relate to
the business of insurance. Although the courts have not frequently addressed
this exemption, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
recently construed the exemption narrowly. In Cochran v. Paco, Inc.,'
the court concluded that an express statement that a statute applied to the
business of insurance was required and that partial repeal of the McCarranFerguson Act should not be inferred from an over all statutory scheme.
In concluding that an express repealer was necessary, the Cochran
court focused on both the language of the Act and its legislative history.
The court noted that the Act reflected Congressional opposition to the
holding of South Eastern Underwriter Ass'n. that insurance was interstate
commerce and found that Congress intended to insulate the insurance industry from federal control."' 6 As stated by the court:
Congress thus returned to the states the plenary power to regulate the
business of insurance that they had enjoyed prior to the Southeastern
Underwriter decision. If Congress intended to invoke its Commerce
Clause powers to occupy part of the field of insurance regulation, it
would expressly say so. Congress wanted to ensure that no future
federal legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause and not spewould be construed as an implied repeal
cifically related to insurance
13 7
of the McCarran Act.
The court found support for this conclusion in statements made in Congress
when the Act was passed. The court quoted Senator Ferguson as stating:
If there is on the books of the United States a legislative Act which
relates to interstate commerce, if the Act does not specifically relate
to insurance, it would not apply at the present time. Having passed
's5
13e

No. 76-1956 (5th Cir. Jan. 2, 1979).

Id.

187 Id.
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the bill now before the Senate, if Congress should tomorrow pass a
law relating to interstate commerce, and should not specifically apply
the law to the business of insurance, it would not be an implied repeal of the bill, and this bill would not be affected, because the Connot . . . said that the new law specifically applied to ingress had
38
surance.
Based on this analysis, the Fifth Circuit held that the Truth In
Lending Act was not a statute specifically relating to the business of insurance. The court so held despite the fact that the Truth In Lending Act
did make reference to certain insurance related charges."' The impact of
this holding is somewhat softened, however, by the court's additional finding
that those aspects of insurance company operations regulated by the Truth
In Lending Act were not "the business of insurance" and consequently were
not shielded from federal regulation.
Although it does not expressly refer to the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
the FHLMC Act would most likely be considered a statute specifically
relating to the business of insurance. Section 305 (a) (1) of the Act permits FHLMC to purchase mortgages "of such quality, type, and class as
to meet generally the purchase standards imposed by private institutional
mortgage investors."'' " Section 305 (a) (2) (C) prohibits FHLMC from
purchasing a conventional mortgage if the outstanding principal balance
exceeds 80% of the value of the property at the time of purchase, unless
"that portion of the unpaid principal balance of the mortgage which is in
excess of such 80 per centum is guaranteed or insured by a qualified ininsurer as determined by the Corporation."' " Thus, the FHLMC Act unambiguously evidences Congressional contemplation that FHLMC would
adopt standards governing the private mortgage insurance acceptable to it.
To the extent the affected activities of private mortgage insurers would
otherwise be within the McCarran-Ferguson Act, these provisions must
be considered a partial repeal of that Act.
This conclusion is buttressed by the legislative history of the FHLMC
Act. The Conference Committee Report accompanying the Act makes it

188 Id.
139 The Truth in Lending Act defines "finance charge" as "the sum of all charges" imposed
"as an incident to the extension of credit, including . . .premium or other charge for any
guarantee or insurance protecting the creditor against the obligor's default or other credit
loss." 15 U.S.C. § 1605(a).
140 12 U.S.C. § 1454(a)(1).
14d11. at 1454(a)(2)(C).
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clear that Congress intended FHLMC to have an impact upon the private
mortgage insurance industry."" The report states:
The conferees believe that private mortgage insurance can play an
important role in developing an effective secondary market in conventional mortgage loans. We urge FNMA and the Federal Home Loan
Mortgage Corporation to encourage their participation, under terms
and conditions that require sound and ethical practices. Specifically,
the conferees expect both FNMA and The FHLMC to take necessary
steps by the issuance of rules and regulations and appropriate examination procedures to assure the prohibition of such conflict of interest
practices as payment or rebates and commissions or other forms of
compensation to officers, directors, or employees or mortgage lenders
or groups of mortgage lenders. " "
If Sections 305 (a) (1) and 305 (a) (2) (C) were not pro tanto repealers of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, and that Act otherwise applied,
the sections would be rendered meaningless. The only alternative available
to FHLMC would be to adopt state law as the final standard by which
private mortgage insurers were to be assessed. If Congress intended that
state law standards be respected by FHLMC, then Congress would have
had no reason to anticipate that FHLMC should promulgate "regulations
and appropriate examination procedures."1" ' An FHLMC abdication to
state regulations is plainly not what Congress intended when it commanded
in Section 305 that FHLMC evaluate mortgages and private mortgage
insurers. There is a strong presumption against construing a statute so as
to render it ineffective. "' In short, before particular aspects of FHLMC's
eligibility requirements would be judicially evaluated, a private mortgage
insurer would first have to demonstrate both that the requirements invalidate, impair, or supersede state law and that the FHLMC Act does not
specifically relate to the business of private mortgage insurance. These
two hurdles are substantial and the cases strongly suggest that they cannot be overcome.
Most case law developed under the McCarran-Ferguson Act focuses
on the question of what constitutes the business of insurance. The United
States Supreme Court recently revisited this question in Group Life Health

"'2H. R. REP. No. 91-1311, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970).
Id.at 17.

143

1,4 Id.

14 See, e.g., Bird v. United States, 187 U.S. 118, 124 (1902); United States v. Blasius, 397
F.2d 203, 207 n.9 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. dismissed, 393 U.S. 1008 (1969); Re White, 266
F. Supp. 863, 866 (N.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Insurance Co. v. Royal Drug Co.14 8 The plaintiffs in Group Life sought
to challenge as violations of antitrust laws the agreements between Blue
Cross and selected pharmacies to provide drugs to Blue Cross subscribers
at fixed prices. The question confronting the Court was whether the agreements were part of the business of insurance and consequently immunized
from the antitrust laws by the McCarran-Ferguson Act. In concluding
that the agreements between Blue Cross and the pharmacies were not the
business of insurance, the Court relied on the principle established in
Securities and Exchange Commission v. National Securities, Inc.' that
the business of insurance did not encompass all the business activities of
insurers. 4 8
The Court has defined the business of insurance, for purposes of the
McCarran-Ferguson Act, to include only those activities directly concerning
the relationship between the insurance company and the insured. As stated
by the Court: "the relationship between insurer and insured, the type of
policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation, and enforcement
-

these were the core of the 'business of insurance.'

"I"

A trilogy of decisions recently issued by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit illustrates the application of the fundamental
principles laid down by the Supreme Court. In Cochran v. Paco, Inc., the
court considered whether the McCarran-Ferguson Act precludes application of the Truth In Lending Act's disclosure requirements to a credit
agreement between a lending institution and a borrower who had obtained
the loan to purchase automobile insurance. 5 ° In Perry v. Fidelity Union
Life Insurance Co., the issues presented were the same as in Cochran,
5
except that the insurance company financed the policy premiums itself. '
In Cody v. Community Loan Corp., a finance company sold borrowers life
insurance policies issued by a sister corporation and deducted the initial
premium for the loan. 5 In each of these cases, the court concluded that
the business of insurance was not involved and that consequently the Truth

14699 S. Ct. 1067 (1979).
147393 U.S. 453 (1969).

99 S. Ct. 1067, 1075-76; See 393 U.S. at 459-60.
149 393 U.S. at 460; see Securties Exchange Comm'n v. Variable Annuity Life Ins. Co., 359
U.S. 65 (1959) (annuity contracts which paid return based on earning from investment of
premiums, not on underwriting of risks, held not in business of insurance).
150 No. 76-1956 (5th Cir. Jan. 2, 1979).
151 No. 76-2709 (5th Cir. Jan. 2, 1979).
'1' No. 76-1687 (5th Cir. Jan. 2, 1979); it is not clear from the opinion whether the insurance was intended only to pay off the loan or whether it was wholly unrelated to the
loan.
148
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In Lending Act governed the transactions. These decisions thus show that
many activities of insurance companies are not part of the business of insurance for purposes of the McCarran-Ferguson Act.
Certain aspects of the eligibility requirements unquestionably relate
to the business of insurance. Most prominent among these are underwriting
standards. Thus, if all other conditions were satisfied, the McCarranFerguson Act would insulate private mortgage insurers from these regulations. Certain of the requirements, however, may be sufficiently removed
from the insurer-insured relationship to qualify for exemption. For example,
a persuasive argument could be made that the conflict of interest provisions
do not relate directly to the contractual agreement between lending institutions and private mortgage insurers.
The remaining consideration would be whether state law regulates
the practice in question. This must be evaluated on a case by case basis.
Most states, however, have comprehensive regulatory schemes for private
mortgage insurers. Of course, as discussed above, the mere existence of
state regulation is not sufficient to establish a defense. Whether the federal
regulations invalidate, impair, or supersede state law is wholly distinct, and
in the case of the eligibility requirements is a most important question.
V.

CONCLUSION

This article has focused upon the history of the private mortgage
insurance industry, its functioning and growth, and its interrelationships with
other elements of the mortgage lending industry. The interrelationships
among mortgage insurers, mortgage lenders, and the federal public secondary market have been mutually beneficial, and have facilitated the expansion of the entire mortgage lending industry. However, while an
attempt was made to describe the existing private mortgage insurance industry and to explain how that industry developed, no attempt was made
to discuss trends for the future. A brief look at those trends reveals a likelihood of continued growth of the mortgage insurance industry and
strengthened interrelationships within the mortgage lending industry as
a whole.
The number of private mortgage insurance companies doing business,
the volume of business done by the industry as a whole, and the industry's
importance to the mortgage lending industry have steadily increased over
the years. There is no indication that this trend will not continue, even
absent changes within the mortgage lending industry. In addition, there
are at least three major factors likely to strengthen this trend.
First, while the focus of this article was upon interrelationships with
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the savings and loan industry because that industry has traditionally supplied the majority of residential mortgage funds in this country, many of
the relationships described here would apply to the mortgage finance industry generally, including commercial banks, mortgage bankers and
credit unions. A variety of factors beyond the scope of this article, such as
the Community Reinvestment Act and recent authority for direct mortgage
banker access to FHLMC, will cause private mortgage insurance to become increasingly important to lenders other than savings and loan associations.
Second, an additional trend, which is beyond the scope of this article
but which should have a profound impact upon the growth of the private
mortgage insurance industry, is the fact that the private mortgage insurance
companies are increasingly developing their own secondary market operations. As a result, the companies are no longer involved in the secondary
market merely from the standpoint of making high ratio loans acceptable
for purchase by FNMA and FHLMC, but rather are themselves purchasing,
packaging and selling mortgage loans. This trend is likely to lead not only
to growth, but to an entirely new set of interrelationships between the
private mortgage insurance companies and the lenders.
Third, a further trend is the increasing involvement of private mortgage
insurers in the issuance of private mortgage backed securities as blanket
insurers of the pool of mortgages underlying the securities, as review underwriters for a fee of the underlying mortgages, and as advisors and consultants in the structuring and marketing of the securities. Thus, it appears
likely that the private mortgage insurance industry will undergo substantial
changes, as well as continued growth, in the foreseeable future.
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